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    n November 2019, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) de-
clared “outer space” to be its fifth operational domain,1 next to those of the 
land, sea, airspace, and cyberspace. While space assets and services have 
played a major role in military and security-related operations for decades,2 
they have remained confined to an ancillary and supportive role to the actual 
conflict fought on Earth. NATO’s announcement, by suggesting that the 
pivotal Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty3 on collective self-defense of 
individual member States could now legitimize joint military actions in outer 
space, heralded a paradigm change, as the use of force in or at least from outer 
space is now considered a distinct possibility. 
Would that mean that Star Wars is about to become a reality? NATO’s 
announcement followed developments over the last few years that, taken 
                                                                                                                      
1. See Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, Press Conference (Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_170972.htm?selectedLocale=en; see also 
Martin Banks, NATO Names Space as an ‘Operational Domain,’ But without Plans to Weaponize It, 
DEFENSENEWS (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-2020-de-
fined/2019/11/20/nato-names-space-as-an-operational-domain-but-without-plans-to-
weaponize-it/; Kestutis Palauskas, Space: NATO’s Latest Frontier, NATO REVIEW (Mar. 13, 
2020), https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/03/13/space-natos-latest-fron-
tier/index.html. 
2. The 1991 Gulf War, where U.S.-led U.N. coalition forces drove Iraqi forces out of 
Kuwait and deep back into Iraq, is often hailed as the “first space war,” given the massive 
and decisive use of satellite navigation by the coalition forces. See, e.g., Larry Greenemeier, 
GPS and the World’s First “Space War,” SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Feb. 8, 2016), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-world-s-first-space-war/. 
3. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, provides 
in relevant part: 
 
[A]n armed attack against one or more of them [the parties] in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party 
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, 
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.  
 
The reference to “in Europe or North America,” strictly speaking, excludes attacks on mem-
ber-State assets in outer space but includes attacks from outer space to either continent, as 
well as any use of armed force in defense or retaliation directed at or through outer space. 













together, make the likelihood of armed conflicts in outer space at least less 
remote. Russian satellites have undertaken unfriendly rendezvous maneuvers 
with Western satellites,4 India flexed its military space muscle by undertaking 
its first anti-satellite test,5 Chinese-U.S. political relations have soured con-
siderably over the last few years with outer space being one of the key inter-
ests at stake,6 and in setting up a ‘Space Force’, the United States made it 
clearly understood that outer space is coming into its own as another opera-
tional warfighting domain.7 
If armed conflicts conducted in or from outer space were to materialize, 
the overarching legal question concerns the limitations that would apply. Or, 
put the other way around, what rights would States have to use force (or 
related instruments to cause damage or destruction) in or from outer space 
against opponents in an armed conflict? Put more simply, what does “the 
law” have to say about a real-world version of Star Wars? 
 
II. SPACE LAW VERSUS THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
Unfortunately, there is no single coherent body of law answering these over-
arching questions. Rather, as outer space is an inherently international realm 
and armed conflicts are an equally global phenomenon (even if not always 
extending across national borders), two different legal regimes, each of com-
prehensive scope, could legitimately lay claim to providing the legal frame-
work within which to answer them. 
On the one hand, “space law,” a distinct body of law encompassing 
“every legal or regulatory regime having a significant impact, even if implic-
itly or indirectly, on at least one type of space activity or major space 
                                                                                                                      
4. See, e.g., Chelsea Gohd, 2 Russian Satellites Are Stalking a US Spysat in Orbit: The Space 
Force is Watching (Report), SPACE.COM (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.space.com/russian-
spacecraft-stalking-us-spy-satellite-space-force.html. 
5. See, e.g., Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, Explained: What’s Mission Shakti and How Was It 
Executed?, ECONOMIC TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
news/politics-and-nation/explained-whats-mission-shakti-and-how-was-it-executed/arti-
cleshow/68607473.cms. 
6. See, e.g., Jacqueline Feldscher & Liu Zhen, Are the U.S. and China on a War Footing in 
Space?, POLITICO (June 16, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/16/war-in-
space-trump-china-1365842. 
7. See, e.g., Matthew Cox, Pentagon Activates Space Command to Prepare for War in the Final 














application,”8 addresses essentially ratione geographiae9 (presumably all) major 
questions involving the use of an area called “outer space.” The cornerstone 
of this legal regime is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,10 currently ratified by 
110 States, including all major spacefaring nations, with twenty-three more 
States having signed the treaty.11 The treaty is generally considered to repre-
sent customary international law, whereby it provides the legal framework 
for all activities in or directed at, the realm of outer space.12 
On the other hand, the law of armed conflict, another distinct body of 
law, addresses, ratione materiae,13 (presumably all) major questions on activi-
ties, events, scenarios, and developments having to do with armed conflict. 
It may be daunting to try and define the law of armed conflict, given that it 
goes back (to some extent) to the dawn of human civilization,14 that 
                                                                                                                      
8. Frans G. von der Dunk, Preface to HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW xxvi (Frans G. von 
der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015). 
9. The term that would habitually be used to indicate that the location where something 
happens is the legally decisive criterion is ratione loci. Ratione loci, however, is usually presumed 
to refer to a particular State’s territorial jurisdiction and such territorial jurisdiction is absent 
in outer space. Cf. infra text accompanying note 28. It is more precise therefore to use the 
somewhat broader term ratione geographiae here. It may be noted that while a number of space 
law rules are phrased in a more functionally oriented context than ratione geographiae, for 
instance when using the key concept of “space object” as the trigger of many relevant rights 
and obligations, the definitions of such key concepts ultimately trace back to the area of 
outer space. In the case of a space object, this concerns the area of operation where that 
object is intended to be sent. See, e.g., Frans G. von der Dunk, International Space Law, in id. 
at 29, 62–63 (and literature cited there). 
10. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
11. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Status of International Agreements Re-
lating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2020, https://www.unoosa.org/docu-
ments/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/TreatiesStatus-2020E.pdf. 
12. On the Outer Space Treaty in general, see, e.g., von der Dunk, International Space Law, 
supra note 9, at 49–78; 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW (Stephan Hobe, Bern-
hard Schmidt-Tedd & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 2009); Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, 
The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 419 (1967); 
BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 215–64 (1997).  
13. While, as will be seen further below, the locations where armed conflicts are fought, 
or certain activities, events, scenarios or developments play out, is relevant to the application 
of the law of armed conflict, the primary trigger of its applicability rests in the existence of 
an armed conflict, or the threat, consequences, or aftermath thereof. 
14. For a brief history of the law on armed conflict, see, e.g., Robert A. Ramey, Armed 













definitions abound,15 and that there is no single treaty providing a generally 
accepted overarching framework.16 Also, in contrast to space law having its 
origins in a single treaty, the law of armed conflict consists of a multitude of 
treaties, often supreme in their own right, as well as an extended and ever-
growing body of customary international law. Nevertheless, to ensure a 
proper analysis along the same broad lines as space law, it is appropriate to 
define the law of armed conflict succinctly as “all law of major and direct 
relevance to armed conflicts,” focusing on when and how they are fought 
and anything else of direct impact on them. 
The question of what rules apply to armed conflicts occurring in or con-
ducted primarily from outer space would have been fairly easy to answer to 
the extent that the two bodies of law do not conflict in the results of their 
application to specific activities, events, scenarios, or developments. Even 
beyond that, in instances where the bodies of law conflicted, if there was a 
single tool of prioritization to determine where one overrides the other, the 
                                                                                                                      
(2000); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 325–48 (2001); REBECCA M. M. WAL-
LACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 247–79 (3d ed. 1997); GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 307–16 (2012); MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 216–39 (5th ed. 1984) (still referring to “international wars”); Elizabeth S. 
Waldrop, Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National Security Implications, 
55 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 157, 217–26 (2004) (focused on outer space and U.S. views on 
use of force therein). 
15. For examples see, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 14, at 325 (“to mitigate at least some of 
the most frightful manifestations of the clash of arms” (emphasis added)); AKEHURST, supra 
note 14, at 229 (“the laws of war were designed mainly to prevent unnecessary suffering” 
(emphasis added)); WALLACE, supra note 14, at 247–79, 247 (“aims to control the use of 
force”); BOAS, supra note 14, at 309 (“to regulate the use of force”); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First-Century War and Its Possible Implications for the 
Law of Armed Conflict, 71 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 299, 412 (1998) (“designed primar-
ily to minimize suffering and prevent unnecessary destruction”). 
16. While the U.N. Charter is seen by many as coming close at least in a number of 
respects, there are many parts of the law of armed conflict that have developed inde-
pendently from, and remain formally outside the Charter’s remit. See infra Parts II–C, II–D. 
On the Charter in general, see, e.g., Jean-Pierre Cot, United Nations Charter, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Apr. 2011), https://opil.ouplaw.com/ 
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e539?rskey=rL9wDs&re-
sult=2&prd=OPIL; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS – A COMMENTARY (Bruno 













differences would be easy to reconcile. Unfortunately, neither will be seen to 
be the case.17 
Thus, the next Part provides an overview of space law, then scrutinizes 
in Part II–B to what extent and how that law specifically addresses the threat 
or use of force in outer space. Part II–C provides a similar overview of the 
law of armed conflict, followed in Part II–D by scrutiny of the extent to 
which and how it addresses outer space. Part III, through six examples, il-
lustrates where the application of the two regimes would give rise to con-
flicting outcomes. Having thus analyzed the fundamental problems, various 
legal concepts and principles will be critically assessed as potential analytical 
legal tools for prioritization in Parts III–A to C, permitting a fairly succinct 
yet coherent, comprehensive, and feasible approach to solving such prob-
lems by way of a matrix on prioritization in Part IV. This is followed by brief 
concluding remarks. 
 
A. The Essentials of Space Law 
 
From the beginning of the space age, the military and security implications 
of space activities were not lost on those involved or observing them.18 The 
development of space law was, to a large extent, premised on the desire—
even hope—of maintaining outer space as a sanctuary for peace. By consen-
sus, the underlying approach to the Outer Space Treaty and space law at 
large consisted of “[r]ecognizing the common interest of all mankind in the 
progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes” 
and “[b]elieving that . . . cooperation will contribute to the development of 
mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between 
States and peoples.”19 So far, the hope that armed conflict in outer space 
could be avoided has proven successful, with space assets and services only 
involved in an ancillary capacity in “terrestrial” armed conflicts. Now that 
this hope is diminishing, the question arises as to what extent space law 
                                                                                                                      
17. The ongoing Woomera Manual project represents the first coherent and compre-
hensive effort to address those questions. See The Woomera Manual, UNIVERSITY OF ADE-
LAIDE, https://law.adelaide.edu.au/woomera/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).  
18. For a good overview of potential military applications of space technology and as-
sets, see Waldrop, supra note 14, at 157–74; more succinctly, Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects 
of the Military Uses of Outer Space, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 8, at 331, 331–34. 
19. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, pmbl. Of course, this provision, as part of the 













effectively and appropriately addresses the possibility of armed conflicts in 
outer space, as many of its principles and rules, based on the hope of peace, 
might not sufficiently address such conflicts. 
The main elements of the principles and rules of outer space law stem 
from the Outer Space Treaty, and three further treaties elaborating specific 
important aspects of that Treaty. These are the 1968 Rescue Agreement,20 
1972 Liability Convention,21 and 1975 Registration Convention.22 As with 
the Outer Space Treaty, these conventions are widely ratified.  
Two other treaty regimes address outer space from a different perspec-
tive. The first regime developed under the aegis of the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU). It is currently based on the 1992 ITU Consti-
tution23 and the 1992 ITU Convention24 (both amended several times) and 
the 2016 Radio Regulations,25 whose relevance is found in the fact that to 
date space activities without the use of radio frequencies are virtually impos-
sible. This body of law has been recognized since the 1959 meeting of the 
World Administrative Radio Conference as including space communications 
within its regime on the coordination of the international use and effects of 
                                                                                                                      
20. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in 
Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter 
Rescue Agreement]. See also generally, e.g., von der Dunk, International Space Law, supra note 9, 
at 78–81; Irmgard Marboe, Julia Neumann & Kai-Uwe Schrogl, The 1968 Agreement on the 
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, in 
2 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 1 (Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & 
Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 2013). 
21. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
See also generally, e.g, von der Dunk, International Space Law, supra note 9, at 82–94; L. J. Smith, 
A. Kerrest de Rozavel & Fabio Tronchetti, The 1972 Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, in 2 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, supra note 20, 
at 83. 
22. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan.14, 1975, 
28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]. See 
also generally, e.g, von der Dunk, International Space Law, supra note 9, at 94–99; Bernhard 
Schmidt-Tedd et al., The 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, in 
2 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, supra note 21, at 227. 
23. Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Dec. 22, 1992, 1825 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter ITU Constitution]. 
24. Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Dec. 22, 1992, 1825 
U.N.T.S. 390. 














radio frequencies.26 The second regime is based on the 1963 Partial Test Ban 
Treaty,27 which addresses nuclear weapons testing and includes outer space 
within its scope. For that reason, many authors effectively considered it the 
first space treaty28 since it preceded the Outer Space Treaty by four years, 
even if outer space was only one realm it addressed. 
Together, these core treaties provide the major legal principles, concepts, 
and rules applicable to nearly all activities conducted in, or fundamentally 
concerning, outer space. The most important of these are those addressing 
outer space as an area where territorial sovereignty or any other form of “na-
tional appropriation”29 is prohibited, making it a res communis, a kind of 
“global commons,” not unlike the high seas.30 The exploration and use of 
                                                                                                                      
26. It effectively became part of the requirements of the Outer Space Treaty through 
Article III. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. III (“States Parties to the Treaty shall 
carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, in accordance with international law.”). For further discussion of the ITU 
and its workings, see, e.g., Frans G. von der Dunk, Legal Aspects of Satellite Communications, in 
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 8, at 456, 458–93; FRANCIS LYALL, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS – THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION AND UNIVER-
SAL POSTAL UNION 17–212 (2011); Jens Hinricher, The Law-Making of the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU) – Providing a New Source of International Law?, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
LUFT- UND WELTRAUMRECHT 489, 489–501 (2004). 
27. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter 
Partial Test Ban Treaty]. See also, e.g., Tronchetti, supra note 18, at 343–44; Stefan Kadelbach, 
Nuclear Weapons and Warfare, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Oct. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e355?rskey=I9GvEB&result=1&prd=OPIL. 
28. See, e.g., Ram Jakhu, Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, in 50 YEARS OF THE OUTER 
SPACE TREATY 13 (2017) (“the 1967 Outer Space Treaty . . . was the second international 
agreement, after the adoption of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, adopted specifically to 
regulate outer space”); cf. also Peter Jankowitsch, The Background and History of Space Law, in 
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 14 (Frans G. von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015) 
(“The . . .  Partial Test Ban Treaty . . . was the first legally binding international instrument 
that clearly acknowledged the fact that outer space constitutes a new dimension”); Nina-
Luisa Remuss, Space and Security, in OUTER SPACE IN SOCIETY, POLITICS AND LAW 520 
(Christian Brünner & Alexander Soucek eds., 2011); Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of the 
Military Uses of Outer Space, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 343 (Frans G. von der Dunk & 
Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015) (“The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty is chronologically speaking 
the first international treaty on arms limitation in outer space”). 
29. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. II. 
30. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 













outer space are qualified as “the province of all mankind”31 and freedom of 
activity in outer space for States is the default baseline. Through these pro-
visions, the Outer Space Treaty effectively inserted the Lotus principle into 
space law as that had been stated by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice: 
 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules 
of law binding upon States therefor emanate from their own free will as 
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achieve-
ment of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States can-
not therefore be presumed.32 
 
Consequently, limitations to a State’s general freedoms can only be imposed 
by international law, notably by treaties and customary international law, the 
two principal sources of international law.33 
One of those limitations is found in Article V of the Outer Space Treaty, 
which requires States to “regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer 
space” and accord them the maximum of supportive and respectful treat-
ment, such as “render[ing] to them all possible assistance in the event of 
accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State 
Party or on the high seas” and to ensure they are “safely and promptly re-
turned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.”34 These obligations 
were further elaborated upon by the Rescue Agreement.35 
Quite uniquely, the twin principles of Articles VI and VII of the Outer 
Space Treaty provide for State responsibility for national space activities con-
ducted by private entities (including obligations to authorize and continu-
ously supervise such activities) and State liability for damage caused by space 
objects owned, launched, or operated by private entities.36 Many countries 
                                                                                                                      
31. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I. 
32. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 44 (Sept. 7).  
33. Treaties and customary international law are generally recognized as representing 
the two major sources of public international law. See Statute of the International Court of 
Justice art. 38(1)(a)–(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; see also, e.g., CASSESE, 
supra note 14, at 119–138; BOAS, supra note 14, at 52–95. 
34. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. V. 
35. See Rescue Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 1–4. 













adopted national space legislation to implement Article VI’s obligation to 
authorize and continuously supervise relevant categories of private space ac-
tivities.37 The Liability Convention then fleshed out Article VII’s liability re-
gime, providing, inter alia, for a fundamental distinction between damage 
caused on Earth, which is subject to absolute liability, and damage caused to 
space objects, which is subject to fault liability, as well as calling, in principle, 
for unlimited compensation.38 
Partly developed as an ancillary tool to help identify space objects caus-
ing damage for the purpose of liability claims, there is a registration system 
for objects launched into outer space. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty 
provided only that by registering a space object, a State “shall retain jurisdic-
tion and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof.”39 The 
Registration Convention then established an actual registration regime, re-
quiring both domestic and international registration of space objects.40 
Finally, States are to conduct space activities in a manner to avoid harm-
ful contamination to celestial objects and with due regard for potentially 
harmful interference with other States’ activities in outer space, imposing 
corresponding duties and rights of consultation.41 As the risks of space de-
bris and harmful interference with other legitimate activities became a matter 
of growing concern, these principles gave rise to international guidelines of 
                                                                                                                      
37. For national space legislation in general and its role in implementing international 
space law, see, e.g., Irmgard Marboe, National Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra 
note 8, at 127. 
38. See Liability Convention, supra note 21, arts. II, III, XII. 
39. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. VIII.  
40. See Registration Convention, supra note 22, art. II (domestic registration), arts. III–
V (international registration). The decision not to use the word “nationality” to refer to 
registered space objects was a conscious deviation from the practice with regard to regis-
tered ships and aircraft, with the result that formally/legally speaking the concept of “flag 
States” does not apply to space objects. Cf., e.g., Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Stephan Mick, 
Article VIII, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, supra note 12, at 151, 156–59; 
Bin Cheng, Space Objects and Their Various Connecting Factors, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW 
OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS 203, 211, 214–15 (Gabriel Lafferranderie & Daphné Crowther 
eds., 1997). 













increasing legal effect and importance42 that may soon rise to the status of 
customary international law.43 
Importantly, the Outer Space Treaty, in addition to its substantive princi-
ples and rules, as often further elaborated by other treaties (status of astro-
nauts, requirements to pay for damage caused and act with due diligence, 
obligations to register space objects, respect the ITU radio frequency coor-
dination process, and abstain from nuclear explosions in outer space), also 
provides a limited set of structural principles, notably concerning the legal 
status of outer space (Article II), the comprehensive attribution of private 
activities to States (Articles VI and VII), and the possibility of exercising 
quasi-territorial jurisdiction over space objects (Article VIII). 
 
B. Space Law and the Threat or Use of Force in Outer Space 
 
The next question is then how and to what extent space law applies more 
specifically to potential or actual armed conflicts. More precisely, the ques-
tion turns to the application of space law if space activities are undertaken 
for strategic, security, or military purposes, either in support of terrestrial 
operations or as self-standing activities aimed at achieving specific results in 
outer space itself. 
To start with, the previously discussed core principles of space law apply 
(and this generally holds true for the rest of space law as well) to military 
space activities. The major exception concerns the international telecommu-
nications regime, as “Member States retain their entire freedom with regard 
to military radio installations”44 under the ITU regime on the coordination 
of the use of radio frequencies. 
The main substantive provision of the Outer Space Treaty in the security 
realm that still echoes the hope that outer space remains a sanctuary of peace 
is the Article III obligation that space activities comply with international law 
                                                                                                                      
42. Notably, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Doc. No. IADC-02-01, Rev. 
1 (Sept. 2007); Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 62 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
No. 20, annex, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/62/20 (2007). The report was subsequently 
endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly. G.A. Res. 62/217, ¶ 26 (Feb. 1, 2008). 
43. Cf. also Carsten Wiedemann, Space Debris Mitigation, in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE 
315 (Imgard Marboe ed., 2012); LOTTA VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT IN 
SPACE LAW: ASSESSING THE PRESENT AND CHARTING THE FUTURE 246–56 (2008).  
44. ITU Constitution, supra note 23, art. 48(1). No comparable clause can be found in 













(at least to the extent that such general international law would not be super-
seded by the specifics of space law itself dictating otherwise).45 It explicitly 
refers to “the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining 
international peace and security”46 in that context.  
In that regard, both the U.N. Charter’s baseline prohibition on the use 
of force (at least in interstate conflicts) that threaten “the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state”47 and the two fundamental categories 
of exceptions to it—the right of self-defense in U.N.-ordered48 or U.N.-
mandated military sanctions49—have become applicable to outer space as 
well. As will be seen, however, its precise ramifications may be even more 
complicated, legally speaking, than on Earth. Beyond the above, space law 
contains only four relevant substantive rules addressing military activities. 
                                                                                                                      
45. See also infra text accompanying notes 112–14. 
46. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. III (emphasis added). 
47. While also addressing the “the threat or use of force . . . in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,” U.N. Charter Article 2(4) focuses on 
the use of such force between sovereign States that threatens “the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of any state.” U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. Other State-to-State conflicts 
involving the use of force may likely be largely covered by the former phrase as well, since 
the United Nations “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” 
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1. By the same token, non-State-to-State conflicts are hardly addressed 
in the Charter. These conflicts may concern (1) purely “internal” conflicts where a State (or 
at least its ruling government) is fighting with insurgents that do not qualify as a State 
(though in a number of cases more or less indirectly supported by (an)other State(s)); (2) 
conflicts within a State where there is nothing like a “ruling government” between various 
powers vying for such authority (and again often more or less indirectly supported by other 
States); or (3) conflicts between one or more States on the one hand and non-State actors 
from outside such States on the other (which again may well be directly or indirectly sup-
ported by other States). The references to U.N. “Members” and “their international rela-
tions” in Article 2(4) may not be easily applicable to these conflicts. Additionally, the prohi-
bition for “the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state” and the absence of a requirement for “the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter ”further stand in the way of 
straightforward application of the Charter and its regime in this context. U.N. Charter art. 
2 ¶ 7. See also, e.g., BOAS, supra note 14, at 316–26; AKEHURST, supra note 14, at 240–47; 
WALLACE, supra note 14, at 255–56; CASSESE, supra note 14, at 332–33. 
48. U.N. Charter art. 42 
49. Id. art. 53. For the sake of convenience, Security Council mandates to regional ar-
rangements to address “where appropriate” threats to international peace and security are 
throughout taken as a corollary to addressing such threats by the Council’s own actions 
under Article 42. Thus, they are addressed together under the heading of “UN-ordered or -













First, the orbiting or stationing of weapons of mass destruction, encom-
passing (at least) biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, anywhere in 
outer space is prohibited.50 Here, the “negative” is more telling than the pro-
hibition itself, as the clause neither prohibits sending weapons of mass de-
struction through outer space nor the stationing of weapons in space other 
than those of mass destruction.51 That the existence of weapons in outer space 
under the Outer Space Treaty is thus limited to the stationing or orbiting of 
weapons of mass destruction only, however, does not negate the applicability 
of specific limitations to the possession or use of any categories of weapons or 
of force in general under Article III, as this in principle causes relevant gen-
eral public international law to also apply in outer space.52 
Second, all military activities, notably, “[t]he establishment of military 
bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and 
the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden” 
and all celestial bodies “shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes.”53 Thus, the moon and other celestial bodies 
were—in contrast to the vacuum of outer space itself—effectively trans-
formed into demilitarized zones. 
Third, Article IX’s limitations on harmful interference with the activities 
of other States54 may also present a legal obstacle to unfettered discretion in 
                                                                                                                      
50. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV (“States Parties to the Treaty undertake 
not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station 
such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”). This is essentially a type of arms control 
clause. 
51. Considering the extent to which they were relying on intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles in the context of their strategic defenses, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
at the time would have accepted a ban on sending weapons of mass destruction through 
outer space. As for non-mass destruction weapons, in 1967 their presence in outer space 
was not considered even remotely realistic thus the issue was not addressed. 
52. A salient example would be the ENMOD Convention. Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 
1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter ENMOD Conven-
tion]. 
53. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV. This is the most forceful clause in the 
treaty in terms of limiting security-related activities in outer space. It is confined in its appli-
cation, however, to celestial bodies. On the issue of “peaceful purposes,” see, e.g., Ramey, 
supra note 14, at 77–82; Tronchetti, supra note 18, at 338–41; Waldrop, supra note 14, at 222–
24. 













using force in outer space, in particular in view of the growing awareness 
that the creation of space debris, whether wanton or not, puts all States’ 
space assets at risk.  
And fourth, there is the clear-cut provision for States party to the afore-
mentioned Partial Test Ban Treaty “to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry 
out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any 
place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its lim-
its, including outer space.”55 
To date, the closest that space law on military uses of outer space has 
come to being tested was in the 1980s, when the United States was contem-
plating deployment of laser weapons in outer space as part of its Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI).56 The issue that arose was whether laser weapons 
would qualify as “weapons of mass destruction,” in which case their deploy-
ment would be prohibited by Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. The 
question was never resolved, principally because SDI never got beyond the 
drawing board. 
More generally, this brief overview of space law, which sprang from the 
hope that outer space would remain free from the use of force, has only 
addressed the surrounding legal issues in a concise and somewhat frag-
mented manner. But, at the same time, it lays a credible claim to space law 
being a regime of law that does and should address all matters pertinent to 
space activities, including when, against all hope, the threat or use of force 
might become a reality—or at least a realistic possibility. 
 
C. The Essentials of the Law of Armed Conflict 
 
As for the law of armed conflict, its legal point of departure was almost ex-
actly the opposite of that of space law. With armed conflict being as old as 
human civilization, the underlying assumption is that, no matter how regret-
table, intense conflicts between States or peoples are an inevitable fact of life 
and will continue to occur. The overarching aim of the law of armed conflict, 
thus, is not to outlaw the use of force, essentially seen as utopian, but rather 
to limit its occurrence to the extent feasible and, when armed conflicts nev-
ertheless occur, to limit their disastrous effects as much as possible. In that 
                                                                                                                      
55. Partial Test Ban Treaty, supra note 27, art. I(1) (emphasis added). As indicated, Ar-
ticle III of the Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, effectively integrates this provision more 
formally into space law. 













regard, the U.N. Charter, while recognizing the need “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war” and wishing “to unite our strength to 
maintain international peace and security,” also calls for the establishment of 
“conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained” and en-
deavors “to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of 
methods, that force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”57 
Again, in contrast to space law, which emerged within a relatively short 
timeframe and, as indicated earlier, did so largely based on a single frame-
work treaty of global applicability, the law of armed conflict represents a 
conglomerate of principles, rules, rights, and obligations that have developed 
over many centuries and that are enshrined in a multitude of treaties and 
customary international law regimes. Hence, efforts abound to bring some 
order into this bewildering variety of legal regimes by grouping many of them 
under broader headings. While for convenience’s sake these headings will 
also be used here, in many cases, the borders between various regimes are 
difficult to determine. In any event, no discussion on their precise contents 
should be allowed to cloud the ultimate overriding aim of the law of armed 
conflict as defined earlier.58 
As for the jus ad bellum, with its roots in such ancient concepts as “just 
war,” it essentially limits the contexts in which any substantial use of force 
would be legitimate.59 Passing a first major psychological threshold with the 
fundamental condemnation of war by a treaty tellingly entitled the General 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,60 it 
culminated in the U.N. Charter, seen by some as the final seal on the jus ad 
bellum by imposing a baseline prohibition on the use of force between States 
with just two exceptions.61 
                                                                                                                      
57. U.N. Charter pmbl. (emphasis added). Again, these provisions, as part of the pre-
amble and not of the operative portion of the treaty, are not themselves legally binding. 
58. That is, to limit the occurrence of armed conflicts to the extent feasible and when 
armed conflicts occur, to limit their disastrous effects as much as possible.  
59. See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 14, at 325–28; BOAS, supra note 14, at 308–9; Ramey, 
supra note 14, at 59–63. 
60. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 
27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57(also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact). See also, e.g., 
BOAS, supra note 14, at 312; WALLACE, supra note 14, at 248–49. 
61. As discussed earlier (supra text accompanying notes 46–48), the two exceptions con-
cerned self-defense and U.N. Security Council-sanctioned use of force. See U.N. Charter 













As for its traditional counterpart, the jus in bello, now often called inter-
national humanitarian law, it focuses on limiting the more specific extent to 
which force could legitimately be used.62 In particular, there is the “Geneva 
system,” originating from initial efforts to alleviate human suffering on bat-
tlefields and then more broadly in the context of armed conflicts, is found 
in four 1949 conventions and three additional protocols (two in 1977 and 
one 2007). The Geneva system has been seen as the core of the jus in bello.63 
The border between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello often became 
blurred. This blurring occurred for several reasons, such as addressing both 
                                                                                                                      
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (last updated Oct. 2015), 
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e349?rskey=vFQsjQ&result=5&prd=MPIL; Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, Prefatory 
Note, in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 85 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d 
ed. 2000); CASSESE, supra note 14, at 296–69, 305–13; BOAS, supra note 14, at 313–15, 326–
40. 
62. See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 14, at 326–28; Ramey, supra note 14, at 48–59. 
63. The Geneva system comprises the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and three addi-
tional protocols. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Proto-
col Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Proto-
col Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption 
of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 261. See also, e.g., The 
Geneva Conventions and their Commentaries, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/trea-
ties-customary-law/geneva-conventions (last visited Jan. 10, 2021); Hans-Peter Gasser, Ge-
neva Conventions I–IV (1949), MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (last updated Dec. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/ 
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e300?rskey=ynKcD4&result=1&prd=OPIL; Emily 
Crawford, Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977), MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (last updated June 2015), https://opil.ou-
plaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1804?rskey= 
vYEoi3&result=1&prd=OPIL; Emily Crawford, Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol II 















legal fields in the same treaties.64 Here, an important example is the “Hague 
system” of conventions originating in the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 
and 1907,65 which addressed both jus in bello limitations on the use of force 
against civilians and neutral States during armed conflicts, and the jus ad bel-
lum aims of disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes.66 
In addition to the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, legal regimes on arms con-
trol and arms limitation treaties form part of the law of armed conflict lato 
sensu. Based on the reasoning that “what you don’t have, you cannot use, not 
even inadvertently,” many treaties address the overarching aims of the law 
of armed conflict by limiting the right to possess certain categories of arms.67 
                                                                                                                      
64. Cf. also WALLACE, supra note 14, at 272, who includes the two strands within a 
comprehensive jus ad bellum: 
  
[T]wo categories – those relating to the actual conduct of hostilities, and those which afford 
a minimum of protection to the individual (humanitarian law). The former are to be found 
principally in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 1899 and 1907 while the 1949 Four 
Geneva Conventions (“Red Cross”) and two additional protocols adopted 1977 comprise 
the latter. 
 
Waldrop, supra note 14, at 221 takes a yet different approach in discerning “two main areas” 
as follows: “In general terms, the Hague treaties deal with the behaviour of belligerents and 
the methods and means of war (for example, lawful and unlawful weapons and targets), 
while the Geneva agreements address the protection of personnel involved in conflicts (e.g., 
Prisoners of War, civilians, the wounded).”. See also, e.g., AKEHURST, supra note 14, at 230–
31. 
65. The Hague system comprises three conventions resulting from the 1899 Peace Con-
ference and thirteen resulting from the 1907 Conference, plus attendant declarations and 
regulations, many of them widely ratified. Collectively, they have had a major impact on the 
development of the jus in bello and jus ad bellum. See Betsy Baker, Hague Peace Conferences (1899 
and 1907), MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (last updated 
Nov. 2009), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e305?rskey=p19Wat&result=1&prd=OPIL.  
66. Cf., e.g., Ramey, supra note 14, at 32–34, 45–50; CASSESE, supra note 14, at 326–28.  
67. Examples include the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxi-
ating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 
26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 49 (1975); 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacte-
riological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-
duction, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 
1974 U.N.T.S. 45; and various U.S.-Soviet treaties limiting the delivery systems of strategic 
nuclear warheads. An example of the latter is Treaty between the United States of America 













Finally, such fluid and partly overlapping concepts as the law of target-
ing,68 the law of neutrality,69 and the law of prize70 are also part of the law of 
armed conflict. The essence of the law of targeting is to limit the infliction 
of harm in specific cases by calling for a balance between such criteria as 
military necessity and the potential for the use of force to cause harm to non-
combatants, neutrals, and protected places, such as hospitals and schools.71 
The ultimate aim of the law of neutrality and law of prize is to determine the 
extent of the legitimate force belligerents may use against neutral States, per-
sons, and goods relative to that which may be used against enemy States, 
persons, and goods.72 To that end, the law of neutrality (properly understood 
it is not a body of law entirely separate from either the jus ad bellum or jus in 
bello) creates fundamental distinctions between belligerents and neutral States 
and outlines their mutual rights and obligations. It focuses on the protection 
and use of neutral territory (that is, of States not engaged in the conflict), neu-
tral persons (for example, citizens of neutral States), and neutral assets such as 
                                                                                                                      
Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, T.I.A.S. No. 11,205 [hereinafter New START 
Treaty]. See also, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 14, at 333–40; Waldrop, supra note 14, at 225–26. 
68. See, e.g., Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Neutrality and Outer Space, 93 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STUDIES 526, 531 (2017) (The law of targeting governs “[a]ttacks against neu-
tral space objects and assets” when they become “lawful military objectives.” They “may be 
attacked if . . . precautions in attack and the prohibition of indiscriminate attack are ob-
served.”); cf. also Ramey, supra note 14, at 34–44; Waldrop, supra note 14, at 221–22. 
69. See, e.g., Von Heinegg, supra note 68, at 528 (“The overall object and purpose of the 
law of neutrality is to prevent escalation of an international armed conflict.”); see also, e.g., 
CASSESE, supra note 14, at 327–28. 
70. See, e.g., Von Heinegg, supra note 68, at 529 (the law of prize essentially deals with 
neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft and their cargoes, as well as enemy merchant 
vessels and civil aircraft in the context of armed conflicts). 
71. This balance first appeared in the broad provisions of Article 22 of the Regulations 
annexed to 1899 Hague Convention II. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land art. 22, annexed to Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter Hague Convention 
II] (“[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited”). This 
provision was further detailed in the Regulations, such as in Article 25, which prohibited 
the “attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not de-
fended.” Id. art. 25. 
72. Cf., e.g., for the law of prize, Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 
115 Consol. T.S. No. 1, 15 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERI-
CAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907) [hereinafter Paris Decla-
ration]; Declaration Concerning the Laws of Maritime War arts. 16, 18, 22–25, Feb. 26, 
1909, reprinted in THE DECLARATION OF LONDON, FEBRUARY 26, 1909, at 112 (James B. 













involved in commerce.73 Elements of that law of neutrality are often found 
or reflected in treaties such as the Hague V74 and Hague XIII75 Conventions. 
 
D. The Law of Armed Conflict and the Threat or Use of Force in Outer Space 
 
The next question is the extent to, and the manner in which, the whole body 
of the law of armed conflict lato sensu applies to outer space, given that for 
the overwhelming part of its development, military uses of outer space were 
the exclusive realm of science fiction. The law of armed conflict historically 
followed the extension of human activities into various domains, and there-
fore largely developed along domain-specific lines. Only relatively recently, 
however, such domains have come to include outer space. 
The two oldest domains are exemplified by Hague V and Hague XIII 
addressing, respectively, “War on Land” and “Naval War.”76 There is no 
treaty law specifically dedicated to the use of force in the air domain.77 For 
that reason, a group of experts collaborated to produce the Air and Missile 
Warfare Manual.78 Drawing on the applicable international law from various 
treaties and customary international law, the manual restates existing inter-
national law applicable to air and missile warfare. Similarly, the cyber domain 
lacks domain-dedicated treaty law, State practice, and opinio juris. The Tallinn 
                                                                                                                      
73. See Bothe, supra note 61.  
74. Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Per-
sons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention V]. 
75. Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval 
War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545; 36 Stat. 2415 [hereinafter Hague Convention 
XIII]. 
76. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
77. See, e.g., WALLACE, supra note 14, at 104–7; AKEHURST, supra note 14, 286–88. The 
Chicago Convention, the overarching framework treaty of global applicability to aviation, is 
“applicable only to civil aircraft, and . . . not . . . to state aircraft,” the latter specifically 
including “[a]ircraft used in military, customs and police services.” Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation art. 3(a)–(b), Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 
295.  
78. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD 














Manual Project79 tries to fill the gap through analogous reasoning and the 
opinions of “distinguished international law practitioners and scholars.”80 
The Woomera Manual project on the law of armed conflict in outer 
space faces the same absence of domain-specific law precisely because of the 
absence thus far of the actual use of force in outer space.81 For instance, the 
law of targeting is specific and precise in outlining its scope, effectively ex-
cluding targets in outer space. Similarly, the law of prize is not fit—let alone 
meant—to apply to “space prizes.”82 
However, the law of armed conflict also includes rules, rights, and obli-
gations that are not domain-specific. Moreover, in several cases, it could be 
argued that, though defined in a domain-specific manner, specific rules, 
rights, and obligations reflect broader principles that may well apply to outer 
space.83 This observation ultimately requires a thorough analysis of those 
rules, rights, and obligations of the law of armed conflict that are without 
question domain-specific and those that are either not domain-specific, or 
should be seen as reflecting underlying principles that are not domain-spe-
cific. 
                                                                                                                      
79. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WAR-
FARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013)). 
80. Michael N. Schmitt, Introduction to id. at 1. Even if their opinions could be consid-
ered as the “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,” how-
ever, they would qualify only “as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 38(1)(d). 
81. See supra note 17. 
82. Cf., e.g., Hague Convention II, supra note 71(even apart from the Convention’s title 
referring to “War on Land,” Article 25 of the annexed Regulations prohibits “towns, vil-
lages, habitations or buildings which are not defended” from being the objects of “attacks 
or bombardments”); Paris Declaration, supra note 72; London Declaration, supra note 72. 
Even apart from the references in the titles to “Maritime Law” and “Naval War,” respec-
tively, Article 3 of the Paris Declaration refers to “[n]eutral goods [which], with the excep-
tion of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy’s flag.” Under space law 
there is no flag-State principle. See supra text accompanying note 37. Note also the definitions 
of “contraband of war” in Articles 22–24 of the London Declaration.  
83. “General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are also recognized as a 














For instance, major arms control and disarmament treaties, such as the 
ABM Treaty,84 while it was in force, and the New START Treaty,85 were 
clearly relevant to the outer space domain. This is also the case for those 
arms proliferation agreements that aim to achieve the same goals, such as 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.86 However, legal regimes addressing specific 
types of arms and limitations or prohibitions on their possession, usage, or 
proliferation usually focus on existing types of arms, which means they focus 
on arms that either by definition are not usable in outer space or are not 
expected to be used in outer space.87 
In summary, this analysis confirms that the law of armed conflict, even 
if largely springing from sources developed exclusively—or at least in prac-
tice—to apply to armed conflicts occurring in the terrestrial domains of land, 
sea, and airspace, may creditably be viewed as providing a baseline for ad-
dressing all areas where the threat or use of force in outer space might indeed 
be a realistic possibility. 
 
III. CONFLICTS OF APPLICATION: A FEW KEY EXAMPLES 
 
While it is impossible here to list, let alone analyze, all possible activities, 
events, scenarios, and developments where the application of seemingly per-
tinent space law rules would be inconsistent with the application of seem-
ingly pertinent law of armed conflict rules, it is important to assess a few key 
examples. 
The first two examples concern the U.N. Charter, the fundamental legal 
source of the jus ad bellum. As indicated above,88 Article III of the Outer 
Space Treaty effectively imported the prohibition of the use of force found 
                                                                                                                      
84. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Soviet 
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 
23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, 944 U.N.T.S. 13 (no longer in force). See also, e.g., Ramey, 
supra note 14, at 101–06; Tronchetti, supra note 18, at 347–48. 
85. New START Treaty, supra note 67. See also, e.g., Tronchetti, supra note 18, at 348–
49. 
86. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
87. An example of a specific category of arms that is to date irrelevant in the outer 
space context are those prohibited by the Ottawa Convention (Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211). 













within Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and its two principal exceptions 
found in Articles 42, 51, and 53 into the domain of outer space law. In doing 
so, it raises a number of issues concerning the special characteristics of outer 
space and space law. 
Especially since the Second World War, many armed conflicts have 
arisen that cannot be characterized as “State-to-State” and hence would not 
squarely fall within the scope of U.N. Charter-based rules.89 This may not 
(yet) be relevant in the outer space context since military activities in outer 
space, at least for the near future, will likely remain limited to States (and 
relatively few States at that). To that extent, the Charter may still cover the 
likely activities, events, scenarios, and developments appropriately and com-
prehensively. 
Within interstate conflicts, the U.N. Charter specifically addresses the 
use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”90 After all, the classic conception of armed conflicts until and includ-
ing the Second World War (and to a considerable extent beyond as well), was 
that they were most dangerous to the existence of a State if they involved 
the deployment of massive armed force directly threatening a State’s national 
territory and its sovereignty over that territory. 
However, by virtue of the structural principles of the Outer Space Treaty, 
territorial sovereignty does not apply to outer space,91 and since there is no 
territory in the legal sense, “territory” cannot be attacked. The Charter can-
not be simply applied in outer space on an “as if” basis, given the profound 
and consciously drafted structural provisions of space law, notably Article II 
of the Outer Space Treaty. Thus, unless an armed attack against a space ob-
ject would in itself threaten the political independence of a State, it would 
not violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 
Does this mean that armed attacks on satellites are not fundamentally 
prohibited by the U.N. Charter, but merely limited under non-Charter-based 
law of armed conflict rules? Under Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty 
and the Registration Convention, registered space objects enjoy a quasi-ter-
ritorial status much akin to that of registered ships and aircraft.92 In turn, 
does that allow belligerents to treat space objects of opposing belligerents as 
                                                                                                                      
89. See supra discussion note 47. 
90. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 14, at 
321–22; Ramey, supra note 14, at 61–63; BOAS, supra note 14, at 315–16. 
91. Cf. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, arts. II, I; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 28–30.  












legitimate targets for the use of force, noting that ships and aircraft can also 
present legitimate targets under the law of armed conflict? To what extent 
would the undeniable differences between satellites on the one hand and 
ships and aircraft, on the other hand, stand in the way of treating them as 
essentially the same? Further, would States then agree to follow the same 
rules that have been developed in a domain-specific manner, such as the 
immunity of warships?93 
A second crucial example in this context concerns the other side of the 
U.N. Charter: applying the right to self-defense in response to an armed at-
tack on a satellite. If an attack on a satellite is not covered by the Charter’s 
fundamental clauses on the use of force, notably Article 2(4), would it still 
trigger the right of self-defense as meeting the Article 51 threshold of an 
“armed attack . . . against a Member of the United Nations?”94 
Or, considering the Charter’s characterization of the right of self-defense 
as “inherent”95 and the ongoing discussion as to a possible customary right 
of self-defense outside the Charter,96 would States whose space objects were 
attacked be entitled to respond with the use of force—or non-forceful means 
of degrading or destroying the responsible State’s capabilities such as by 
cyber interference97—outside the Charter where it would not be necessary 
to meet its triggers of territorial integrity or political independence?98 And, if 
so, would such an entitlement translate into a right to attack terrestrial assets 
of the attacker instead of or in addition to attacking its satellite(s)? Or would 
counterattacks on the attacker’s satellites be legitimized as countermeasures 
                                                                                                                      
93. Cf. UNCLOS, supra note 30, art. 95. Note that, as discussed supra text accompanying 
note 37, in the context of space law, the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty made a conscious 
decision not to use the word “nationality” for properly registered space objects, thus devi-
ating from the practice with regard to ships and aircraft, effectively suggesting the status of 
a space object is not entirely similar to that of a ship or an aircraft. 
94. U.N. Charter art. 51. Arguably, the phrase “against a Member” could include its 
satellites, certainly if of crucial importance for the defense of a country in general terms, just 
like that phrase has already in a number of cases been claimed to include a State’s nationals. 
95. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
96. The examples usually discussed in this context are anticipatory self-defense and/or 
related rights, such as humanitarian intervention. See CASSESE, supra note 14, at 307–21, 341; 
BOAS, supra note 14, at 308, 320–26, 333–35; Ramey, supra note 14, at 62; Waldrop, supra 
note 14, at 217–20. 
97. As addressed in the TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 79; see also Jack M. Beard, Legal 
Phantoms in Cyberspace: The Problematic Status of Information as a Weapon and a Target Under Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, 47 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 67 (2014). 













or reprisals, where the legitimacy of the use of force may be restricted merely 
by such concepts as proportionality and necessity and a lack of direct human 
victims?99 
A third case may exemplify relevant issues concerning the jus in bello fo-
cus on issues of direct humanitarian concern, such as the treatment of pris-
oners of war or non-combatant citizens of belligerents (or those of neutral 
States). In doing so, by implication it also defines a class of persons qualifying 
as combatants, hence legitimate targets for the opposing belligerent’s use of 
force.100 In outer space, this may not be relevant as the presence of humans 
in outer space for specific military purposes (or even more generally speak-
ing) remains quite limited.  
Yet, if this changes, applying the jus in bello rules concerning combatants 
runs afoul of the fundamental principle of space law that astronauts, regard-
less of their nationality or affiliation, should be treated as “envoys of man-
kind” and receive all reasonably possible support, as well as the right to be 
repatriated to their home State as soon as possible.101 Should this rule apply, 
as a plain text reading of the Outer Space Treaty requires?102 But then, what 
happens when an astronaut belonging to one belligerent and ends up under 
the control of an opposing belligerent? Certainly if the astronaut (potentially 
also in violation of space law itself) was engaged in military operations and 
thus qualifies as a combatant, would not the jus bello rules rather than space 
law, apply in this regard?103 
A fourth exemplary issue arises in a similar context. A key principle of 
space law concerns the liability of the launching State for damage caused by 
its space objects, including onward damage from secondary collisions caused 
                                                                                                                      
99. See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 14, at 305–21; BOAS, supra note 14, at 316–26. 
100. Cf., e.g., Ramey, supra note 14, at 48–59. 
101. Cf., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. V; Rescue Agreement, supra note 20, 
art. 1–4. 
102. Note that the default interpretation of any treaty should be “in good faith in ac-
cordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 
31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
103. Note that most astronauts (and cosmonauts, which is merely the Russian transla-
tion of astronauts) in the early days of space exploration were actually military personnel. 
The Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit such involvement of military personnel, while 
non-peaceful activities are only prohibited as far as celestial bodies are concerned. Outer Space 













by the space debris resulting from primary collisions.104 Damage caused on 
Earth gives rise to absolute liability, while, if caused to other space objects, 
a determination of fault would be required before liability can be estab-
lished.105 More generally, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty requires in-
ternational consultations before undertaking activities that may harmfully in-
terfere with other States’ space activities.106 
Yet, how would these concepts square with the most fundamental prin-
ciples of the law of armed conflict, whether U.N. Charter-based or not, as 
discussed in the first two examples, that permit a belligerent to destroy or 
damage objects of its opposing belligerent constituting lawful military objec-
tives? In this example, a State’s discretion is bounded only by law of armed 
conflict rules, such as as military necessity and proportionality.107 
Fifth, a further important aforementioned principle of space law is found 
in Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention’s 
requirement that States register space objects they launched.108 The obvious 
aim of registration is to allow easier identification of objects in outer space, 
mainly to determine responsibility for compliance with international (space) 
law, and more specifically, to determine liability for damage caused by space 
objects. This obligation is, in principle, applicable to military space objects. 
It requires the registering State to provide key parameters precisely for such 
purposes of identification.109 
Yet, how would this requirement of sharing key information on launched 
space objects square with the silently but undeniably accepted entitlement of 
a belligerent under the law of armed conflict to gain a military advantage by 
                                                                                                                      
104. See Liability Convention, supra note 21, arts. II–V. 
105. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
106. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
107. Cf. on military necessity and proportionality, e.g., Ramey, supra note 14, at 35–37, 
39–40. Note that for damage caused to space objects fault liability applies, and, while the 
precise definition of fault is subject to considerable discussion (on this, see, e.g, Frans G. von 
der Dunk, Too-Close Encounters of the Third-Party Kind: Will the Liability Convention Stand the Test 
of the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 Collision?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE 
OF SPACE LAW 2009, at 199 (Corinne M. Jorgenson ed., 2010)), there should be little debate 
that if “fault,” however defined, gives rise to liability, “intent” and wanton destruction would 
certainly also give rise to liability. 
108. See supra text accompanying note 39.  
109. Registration Convention, supra note 22, art. IV(1). Key parameters required to be 
provided are “(a) Name of launching State or States; . . . (c) Date and territory or location 
of launch; (d) Basic orbital parameters, including: (i) Nodal period; (ii) Inclination; (iii) Ap-













cloaking its military strategies and capabilities in secrecy? There are particular 
domain-specific rules of the law of armed conflict, such as those prohibiting 
the use of internationally recognized emblems and protective symbols to dis-
guise military objects.110 Whether such rules would apply, or even make 
sense, in outer space is questionable—and merely trying to hide one’s mili-
tary resources is certainly not included in any such rules. 
A sixth example concerns the straightforward prohibitions on stationing 
or orbiting weapons of mass destruction in outer space and establishing mil-
itary bases and undertaking military activities on the Moon and other celestial 
bodies. These stem from the general and quite forceful provision that “[t]he 
Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the 
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes,”111 and the even more fundamental 
provisions declaring outer space open to all States and “not subject to na-
tional appropriation, by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, 
or by any other means.”112 These provisions offer the clearest statement of 
the hope of the Outer Space Treaty’s drafters to maintain the celestial bodies 
as sanctuaries for peace. 
However, such obligations would run counter to the sovereign discretion 
of States to maximize their military effectiveness as long as they do not over-
step specific—but still rather broad—boundaries between States flowing 
from the law of armed conflict. In this respect the law generally focuses on 
the limitations of belligerent use of the territory of a neutral State,113 but, as 
a matter of law, there is no State territory on celestial bodies. 
As these six key examples have shown, the two rather differently struc-
tured bodies of outer space law and the law of armed conflict have almost 
diametrically opposite points of departure. As a result, for many activities, 
events, scenarios, and developments where both regimes apply, conflicting 
legal outcomes result. This, of course, is where the need for legal prioritiza-
tion arises. In other words, how can we resolve the conundrum of which 
legal body of law should override the other in case of conflicts of law? 
 
                                                                                                                      
110. Additional Protocol I, supra note 63, art. 38. Examples include the red cross, red 
cross, and red lion and sun, and the protective emblem for cultural property. 
111. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV. 
112. Id. art. II. 













A. Unraveling the Prioritization Issue: The Lex Specialis and Lex Posterior Princi-
ples 
 
In solving conflicts between two different bodies of international law result-
ing from their application to the same activities, events, scenarios, or devel-
opments, two well-known approaches attempt to prioritize the application 
of the one regime in toto over the other regime.114 
The first concerns the principle lex specialis derogat lege generali.115 For space 
law, the clause “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the 
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, in accordance with international law”116 is widely interpreted to mean 
that general international law only applies in outer space where space law itself 
is moot or fundamentally open to conflicting interpretations.117 Otherwise, 
it would make little sense to outline certain rules of space law that are differ-
ent from ones applicable in similar contexts on Earth.118 In other words, this 
offers a clear manifestation of lex specialis derogat lege generali.  
However, that does not help resolve the current problem. While the law 
of armed conflict may not provide any real equivalent to the single clause of 
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty confirming space law’s status as lex 
specialis, effectively it does also constitute a lex specialis when compared to the 
lex generalis of public international law. 
The historic development of the law of armed conflict vis-à-vis other 
rules of public international law may well have made it look, alternatively, as 
though the two were developing alongside each other, that the former was 
                                                                                                                      
114. See generally Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: 
Different Techniques in the Fragmentation Of Public International Law, 22 DUKE JOURNAL OF COM-
PARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (2012) (referring to “conflicts of norms” as op-
posed to the (potentially) more confined notion of “conflicts of laws”). 
115. See also, e.g., BOAS, supra note 14, at 46, 65, 107; Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of Inter-
national Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 136–37 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003); Nele 
Matz-Lück, Treaties, Conflicts between, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (last updated Dec. 2010), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law: 
epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1485?rskey=2tAaj7&result=1&prd=OPIL. 
116. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. III. 
117. See, e.g., Frans G. von der Dunk, International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE 
LAW 29 (Frans G. von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015), at n.1.  
118. Examples are the absence of territorial sovereignty in outer space, see Outer Space 
Treaty, supra note 10, art. II; comprehensive State responsibility also for private space activ-
ities, id. art. VI; and the equally comprehensive State liability for damage caused by private 













simply a subset of the latter, or even the reverse, with public international 
law being a subset of the law of armed conflict. The premise of the third 
view was that the threat or use of force between nations was a core element, 
probably the most salient one, of public international law because it dealt 
with conflicts between nations and their resolution, either peacefully or oth-
erwise. Over time, however, as wars became more devastating and the killing 
and suffering of humans became less acceptable, international law has come 
to address fundamental rights such as the human right to life and liberty, as 
well as strengthen the baseline right of sovereign States not to be attacked.119 
Yet there is no question today that the law of armed conflict allows those 
fundamental rights—and many others—to be set aside partially or com-
pletely in an armed conflict, fundamentally limited only by rules of jus cogens120 
or conditions that the law of armed conflict itself imposes.121 In that sense, 
the special context of an armed conflict overrides the applicable rules of 
“peacetime” international law as the default regime. In other words, the law 
of armed conflict serves as lex specialis compared to the lex generalis of peace-
time international law. This means, of course, that the lex specialis principle 
does not solve the conundrum, as it is unable to determine the priority 
                                                                                                                      
119. While originally, the sovereign right of States to resort to arms may have been 
limited by little more than the semi-legal, moral concept of a “just war,” further major lim-
itations came to be added. In particular in the twentieth century, as evidenced by the for-
malization of the sovereignty principle (which had hitherto effectively been unnecessary as 
being rather self-evident); key clauses of the U.N. Charter, such as Article 2(1) that added 
concepts of “equality” of sovereignty and the prohibition of intervention in internal affairs 
of a State in Article 2(7); the general development of a body of human rights law from the 
Charter itself (e.g., the preamble and Article 1(1)–(3)); and such specific regimes as the Gen-
ocide Convention. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Cf. also in general terms the literature 
cited supra note 14. 
120. On jus cogens, see, e.g., BOAS, supra note 14, at 95–102 (also discussing obligations 
erga omnes in that context); CASSESE, supra note 14, at 138–48; WALLACE, supra note 14, at 
33–34. 
121. It is, for example, obviously an internationally wrongful act for one State to kill, 
seriously harm, or detain the citizens of another State merely because of their citizenship; 
the law allowing the latter to initiate applicable remedies under international law and/or 
initiate appropriate legal proceedings, for instance, before the International Court of Justice. 
Yet, as basically bounded only by rules of jus cogens and the law of armed conflict itself per-
taining to belligerents and neutral States, in the context of armed conflicts killing, seriously 
harming, and detaining nationals of other States, as well as destroying or damaging the prop-
erties or parts of the territories of such other States may well be legitimized—instead of 













between space law and the law of armed conflict, two leges speciales, each 
claiming to be superior to the other “more general” law. 
A further problem is that the U.N. Charter is not only an important com-
ponent of peacetime international law, but also of both space law and the 
law of armed conflict. To that extent, the doctrinal separation between space 
law and the law of armed conflict becomes somewhat blurred. As discussed 
earlier, Article III of the Outer Space Treaty imports the Charter’s double-
pronged approach of a basic prohibition on the use of force between States, 
coupled with the two exceptions of self-defense and U.N.-mandated use of 
force, into the realm of outer space.122 Of course, those Charter provisions 
also underlie the jus ad bellum. 
The other generic principle often turned to in determining priority is lex 
posterior derogat legi priori, but as Michaels and Pauwelyn have noted, “although 
the lex posterior rule has occasionally been used to resolve conflicts between 
two branches of international law, this creates some unease.”123 The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties refers rather more narrowly to “succes-
sive treaties relating to the same subject matter,”124 as opposed to “successive 
laws.” This, too, is of little help given that both outer space law and the law 
of armed conflict have continuously developed by way of a range of different 
treaties since first discerned as specific bodies of law. It would be well nigh 
impossible to decide where “posterity” exists that would overrule a contra-
dictory principle or rule.  
In short, given the complexity of the issue, both tools are simply too 
blunt to provide solutions, since they assume one body of law to be princi-
pally and across the board superior to the other. If space law in toto were 
given such principled priority, belligerents in outer space could never treat 
enemy astronauts as combatants,125 States would have to pay for damage 
caused to opposing belligerents in the context of perfectly legitimate military 
space operations,126 and they would be required to provide crucial strategic 
information on military objects launched into outer space.127 If, by contrast, 
the law of armed conflict were to prevail in toto, the efforts of space law to 
                                                                                                                      
122. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48. 
123. Michaels & Pauwelyn, supra note 114, at 366. 
124. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 102, art. 30. 
125. Cf. supra discussion accompanying notes 32, 64, 66, 94–97. 
126. Cf. supra discussion accompanying notes 34, 65, 67–68, 98–101. 













preserve outer space as an area open to all humankind and to all astronauts,128  
to hold liable those causing damage,129 and to guarantee access to the Moon 
and celestial bodies for peaceful purposes would (at least to a very large ex-
tent) be ineffectual and virtually defunct.130 
All of these results would present fundamentally problematic and unwel-
come outcomes. As such, to solve the prioritization issue, refuge must be 
found in more specific and refined tools, usable at the level not of legal re-
gimes in toto but of individual activities, events, and developments. 
 
B. Unraveling the Prioritization Issue: The U.N. Charter and Treaty Interpretation 
 
The examples briefly scrutinized above included two that made specific ref-
erence to the U.N. Charter. The Charter helpfully provides “[i]n the event of 
a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”131 But 
what exactly does this establishment of the Charter as lex superior mean in the 
current context? 
To start with, though confined to “obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement,” the Charter’s priority would also extend to all customary 
international law, not just that reflected in an agreement, at least as the de-
fault approach. It would be illogical to allow U.N. member States to undercut 
the hierarchical superiority of the Charter by choosing to generate State prac-
tice and the accompanying opinio juris while avoiding codification through an 
international agreement.132 Then, as indicated, the U.N. Charter serves as the 
baseline for the jus ad bellum. This stems from the broader mandate of the 
United Nations “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” 
“to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security,” and “to 
ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that 
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”133 In other 
                                                                                                                      
128. Cf. supra discussion accompanying notes 19, 28–30, 32, 46, 105–07. 
129. Cf. supra discussion accompanying notes 34, 65, 67–68, 98–101. 
130. Cf. supra discussion accompanying notes 19, 28–30, 32, 46, 105–07. 
131 U.N. Charter art. 103. 
132. Such an interpretation would most likely have to be qualified as “unreasonable” 
or even “manifestly absurd” in the terminology of Article 32(b) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 102; see also infra text accompanying notes 132–35. 













words, the Charter’s hierarchical superiority would, in principle, subsume the 
general body of the jus ad bellum, which, from that perspective, would be 
viewed as essentially a detailed elaboration of the Charter’s legal regime. 
Beyond that, yet intricately linked to it, the mandate of the United Na-
tions is also “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person,”134 as given shape through numerous trea-
ties and U.N. initiatives, including those addressing certain jus in bello aspects 
of armed conflicts.135 Given the understanding that the jus ad bellum and the 
jus in bello are increasingly seen as two overlapping parts of a continuum ra-
ther than two separate bodies of law,136 at least the broader principles en-
shrined in the jus in bello—the basic distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, for example—would override potentially contradictory provi-
sions of space law, inasmuch as they represented detailed elaborations of the 
Charter’s principles. 
This hierarchical and principled superiority of the U.N. Charter, and any 
law of armed conflict rules it takes with it, only goes as far as the Charter 
applies, as determined by the structural principles of space law. Thus, it does 
not solve the problems noted above regarding its applicability in outer space 
where national territory does not exist, as the Charter’s regime on the use of 
force against national territory does not apply, and the right to use force and 
exercise self-defense may well have to be based elsewhere than the Charter. 
The specific and targeted rule of Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, which 
as argued is effectively part of both space law and the law of armed conflict, 
does not by itself allow prioritization on the applicability of many elements 
of the law of armed conflict and outer space law. Rather, clarification by 
resort to additional analytical tools is needed. As a starting point, “any sub-
sequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agree-
ment of the parties regarding its interpretation”137 could serve as an addi-
tional interpretive tool if the ordinary meaning, context, object, or purpose 
of the treaty does not provide sufficient clarity. This creates the possibility 
                                                                                                                      
134. Id. 
135. Cf., e.g., Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and 
Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 3318 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974); ENMOD Convention, supra note 
52; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weap-
ons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. 
136. See supra discussion accompanying notes 61–63; sources cited notes 61–63.  













for customary international law, based as it is on State practice and opinio juris, 
to sharpen, direct, or possibly even change what originally was only an obli-
gation stemming from a treaty clause.138 
Because there has been no use of force in outer space to date, there is 
no subsequent State practice to be analyzed; thus, this interpretative tool is 
not currently useful. Unfortunately, with increasing tensions in outer space, 
relevant practice may soon appear. If that were to occur, it might then be-
come helpful in resolving relevant issues of hierarchical superiority. 
The next analytical tool stems from the basic understanding that the 
States parties to a treaty ultimately determine what substantive rights and 
obligations they have given their consent by way of ratification or accession. 
Thus, treaty interpretation requires that “the terms of the treaty [be seen] in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose”139 to determine “if it 
is established that the parties so intended”140 relevant terms to be interpreted. 
Applying the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it also allows for 
the use of “supplementary means of interpretation . . . to confirm the mean-
ing resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to article 31 . . . leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”141 This last clause is based on a broader 
fundamental principle that any law has to be at least potentially effective, and 
law that would be ineffective should be appropriately reinterpreted.142 
This tool solves some of the prioritization issues. There is little doubt 
that the States parties to the relevant space treaties did not intend to (and it 
would, therefore, also be “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” to assume 
they would) require belligerents to treat enemy astronauts as “envoys of 
mankind,” certainly if they display all the characteristics of military astronauts 
or engage in military operations, or both. In such a specific context, the ob-
ligations of Article V of the Outer Space Treaty and the Rescue Agreement143 
should bow to the applicable rules of the law of armed conflict on the 
                                                                                                                      
138. Cf. also, e.g., WALLACE, supra note 14, at 233–34; BOAS, supra note 14, at 63–64, 
84–86. 
139. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 102, art. 31(1). 
140. Id. art. 31(4). 
141. Id. art. 32. 
142. See, e.g., BOAS, supra note 14, at 134 (referencing the concept ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat); cf. also, on the related concepts of “supervening impossibility of performance” and 
rebus sic stantibus, WALLACE, supra note 14, at 240–42. 
143. See supra discussion accompanying notes 32, 64, 66, 94–97, 118; see also Ramey, 













treatment of enemy combatants and enemy citizens. Similarly, it is “mani-
festly absurd or unreasonable” and contrary to the intentions of States par-
ties to the relevant treaties to require a belligerent to compensate for damage 
caused by its space objects to another belligerent, as long as the conduct 
producing the damage was lawful under the law of armed conflict. In this 
context of belligerent-versus-belligerent scnearios, the law of armed conflict 
would have priority over Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Lia-
bility Convention.144 
That still leaves, however, some major priority issues unresolved. These 
include the legal status of space objects vis-à-vis the territorial approach of 
the U.N. Charter, the extent to which the use of self-defense or use of 
(armed) force not meeting the thresholds of the Charter would be legitimate, 
the applicability of the space law-registration requirements, the general avail-
ability and accessibility of outer space to all States, and the prohibition on 
using celestial bodies for other than peaceful purposes. No principled prior-
itization of the law of armed conflict in these instances can be justified by 
reference to the superiority of the Charter, subsequent State practice, State 
party intentions, or that manifestly absurd or unreasonable results would 
otherwise arise. 
For instance, the prohibitions of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty to 
demilitarize celestial bodies were agreed upon specifically and consciously, 
as evidenced by the terminology. And it certainly would be contrary to “the 
ordinary meaning” of the terms “in their context and in the light of its [the 
treaty’s] object and purpose”145 to interpret them otherwise. Similarly, any 
lack of applicability of U.N. Charter rules caused by the differentiation be-
tween “territory” and “quasi-territory” in the legal sense, concepts that were 
consciously and explicitly accepted under the Outer Space Treaty, cannot be 
solved by reference either to the status of the Charter itself as lex superior or 
the interpretive tools just discussed.146 
In sum, treaty interpretation rules should be used only where other pri-
oritization tools do not offer a better solution and where the application of 
those tools would give rise to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. 
 
                                                                                                                      
144. See supra discussion accompanying notes 34, 65, 67–68, 98-101, 119, 122; see also 
Ramey, supra note 14, at 89–91. Obviously, damage caused to third parties would be a fun-
damentally different matter; see also infra, chapter IV. 
145. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 102, art. 31(3). 













C. Unraveling the Prioritization Issue: Pacta Sunt Servanda, Third States, and Neu-
trals 
 
One of the most fundamental rules of treaty law and public international law 
as a whole is that “a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a 
third State without its consent,”147 a simple restatement of the old maxim 
pacta tertiis nec prosunt nec nocent.148 Ultimately based on the sovereignty of 
States, this maxim is (still) a foundational principle of international law, 
which, as confirmed in the seminal obiter dictum of the Lotus judgment,149 
allows each State, barring the exceptional cases of jus cogens,150 to decide with 
full discretion what legally binding obligations it will accept and by what legal 
regimes it will be bound. 
Perhaps most importantly, this sovereign discretion translates into the 
right for each State (of course, within the boundaries both of any applicable 
jus cogens and international obligations entered into by such a State including 
the U.N. Charter obligation to maintain international peace and security151) 
to determine its preferred level of involvement and participation in an armed 
conflict. Is it going to engage itself on the battlefields with armed forces? Is 
it going to act as an ally of one of the parties to the armed conflict, doing 
everything to support it except engaging in military operations itself? Is it 
going to engage or continue to engage in trade and other contacts considered 
beneficial to its interest with any or all of the States fighting in the conflict? 
Or is it going to undertake an effort to remain completely outside of the 
conflict—to the extent today’s globalized world makes that possible—and 
not have any economic, social, or cultural ties with parties to that conflict? 
It is at this point, of course, where the concept of neutrality becomes rele-
vant. 
                                                                                                                      
147. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 102, art. 34. 
148. See CASSESE, supra note 14, at 126, 132–33; BOAS, supra note 14, at 59; WALLACE, 
supra note 14, at 235–36. 
149. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 119–20.  
151. U.N. Charter arts. 2, 39–42, 51. Note, however, that while Articles 42 and 43 have 
often been taken to give rise to a legal obligation of member States to participate in the use 
of force directed by the United Nations, actual practice has shown that in the few cases 
where those articles were invoked, member States maintained their national discretion to do 
so, as also actually implied by the requirement of Article 43 to conclude agreements in such 
circumstances. On this discussion, see, e.g., BOAS, supra note 14, at 335–38; WALLACE, supra 













The initial problem is that the continued existence of a law of neutrality 
has become increasingly subject to debate.152 Nevertheless, the concept of 
neutrality continues to be relevant, given the existence of treaty clauses and 
rules qualifying as customary international law which, in one way or another, 
specifically refer to that concept. 
Still, the concepts of “neutrality” and a “neutral State” have never been 
authoritatively defined in treaty law. For instance, while the drafters of 
Hague V stated that they were “desirous of defining the meaning of the term 
‘neutral,’”153 the Convention does not do so, and in its substantive regime 
focuses on the rights and duties of “neutral Powers,” “neutral territory,” and 
“neutral persons”154—without defining any of those terms either. Likewise, 
Hague XIII refers to the need to address “relations between neutral Powers 
and belligerent Powers,” the desire “to regulate the results of the attitude of 
neutrality,” and the “admitted duty to apply these rules impartially to several 
belligerents,”155 without defining either neutral or belligerent, or even 
providing relevant clues in its substantive regime. 
For helpful definitions, one therefore needs to look elsewhere. A Com-
mon dictionary definition of neutrality is “[the] refusal to take part in a war 
between other powers;”156 or “[t]he state of not supporting or helping either 
side in a conflict, disagreement.”157 Other helpful legal definitions proposed 
are “[the] impartial treatment of belligerents and non-participation in the 
conflict,”158 and “the attitude of impartiality adopted by third States towards 
belligerents and recognized by belligerents.”159 And, perhaps most compre-
hensively, Bothe characterizes neutrality as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                      
152. See, e.g., Von Heinegg, supra note 68, at 532 (“[a]lthough there seems to be no 
consensus among States as to the continuing validity of the law of neutrality”); CASSESE, 
supra note 14, at 329, discussing its purportedly decreasing relevance.  
153. Hague Convention V, supra note 74, pmbl. (emphasis added). 
154. See, respectively, id. arts. 1–10, 11–15, 16–18. 
155. Hague Convention XIII, supra note 75, pmbl. 
156. Neutrality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
neutrality (last visited Jan. 10, 2021). 
157. Neutrality, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/neutrality  (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2021). 
158. Joshua J. Wolff, Interrupted Broadcasts? The Law of Neutrality and Communica-
tions Satellites 8 (2020) (referring to YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-
DEFENCE 26 (2d ed. 1994) (unpublished LLM thesis at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln).  
159. Von Heinegg, supra note 68, at 528, quoting 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 













[T]he particular status, defined by international law, of a State not party to 
an armed conflict . . . . This status entails specific rights and duties in the 
relationship between the neutral and the belligerent States. . . . On one 
hand, there is the right of the neutral State to remain apart from, and not 
to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the 
duty of non-participation and impartiality.160 
 
Consequently, according to Von Heinegg, neutral States would be those 
“States that choose not to participate on behalf of either party to [a] conflict 
[and are] . . . obliged to remain impartial vis-à-vis the belligerents.”161 In other 
words, for a particular armed conflict, neutral States remain third parties in 
a fundamental legal sense. 
Neutrality, therefore, at the core is nothing but the law of force equiva-
lent of third-party status in the broader context of international law, framing 
the sovereign right of a State to decide whether it wants to be “in” or “out”. 
“In” and “out” in general international law means being party to a treaty 
respectively not being a party to a treaty.162 “In” and “out” in the law of force 
means becoming a belligerent or an ally of one respectively deciding to re-
main neutral. Logically, the result of any such decision, whether consciously 
taken or not, or whether consistent throughout the conflict or changing dur-
ing its course, brings with it a concomitant host of legal rights and obliga-
tions. Whatever the extent to which a State becomes engaged in an armed 
conflict, it must accept the corresponding set of legal rights and obligations 
that go with it—but, having made a particular choice, it does not accept the 
rights and obligations that would go with a different choice. 
Neutrality may well ultimately be based on a State’s involvement respec-
tively non-involvement in an international armed conflict, it does not give 
rise to a simple dichotomy between belligerent States and neutral States. 
Whatever elements of the law of neutrality are still in force recognize that in 
today’s interdependent world there will be few armed conflicts where third 
                                                                                                                      
160. Bothe, supra note 61, ¶ 1. 
161. Von Heinegg, supra note 68, at 528. 
162. It might be pointed out that as concerns State sovereignty, deciding to be “in” or 
“out” works similarly in the context of customary international law, the other main source 
of international law. States decide on their own State practice and what level of opinio juris 
they want to express, which can either align with other States’ practice and opinio juris, caus-
ing those States to be bound by the resulting customary international law, or create a “per-
sistent objector” status taking such a State outside of the relevant set of rules, rights, and 
obligations. On the phenomenon of the “persistent objector,” cf., e.g., BOAS, supra note 14, 












States are willing—or indeed able—to maintain no ties whatsoever with ei-
ther belligerent. 
Consequently, some States are “less neutral” than others, without neces-
sarily becoming belligerents themselves or even a formal ally of a belligerent. 
Relevant portions of the law of neutrality should determine when a State can 
still be called a neutral State, and what rights and obligations vis-à-vis bellig-
erents (and vice versa) would result from that determination. The bottom 
line is that if States have not crossed the threshold and become belligerents, 
they should not enjoy the special set of rights and obligations accorded bel-
ligerents. They would, as a consequence, continue to apply the applicable 
legal framework specific to the domain, for instance, space law when it 
comes to outer space.163 
By analogy to the famous comparison of property rights to a “bundle of 
sticks,”164 the rights of neutral States amount to a “bundle of rights.”165 Neu-
tral States, their nationals, and their resources enjoy the benefit of rights 
based on their formal status as neutrals. But, recognizing that pure neutrality 
is utopian in today’s interconnected world, they may miss out on the enjoy-
ment of certain “rights” from that bundle to the extent that their behavior is 
not that of a “pure” neutral, as defined by the applicable elements of the law 
of neutrality—without thereby becoming belligerents themselves.166 
Thus, the law of neutrality, as a subset of the law of armed conflict, 
loosely encompasses all rules dealing with the fundamental distinction be-
tween the non-participants and the participants to an armed conflict. It can 
                                                                                                                      
163. Cf., e.g., Michel Bourbonnière, The Ambit of the Law of Neutrality and Space Security, 
36 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 205, 226 (2006). 
164. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (describing a “bundle of sticks” as 
a “collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property”).  
165. See Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the 
Property Symposium, 8 ECON JOURNAL WATCH, Sept. 2011, at 193 (2011);  
166. Note, moreover, that following this approach the “sticks” may change over time. 
Some may get added, others may by contrast disappear completely, and the criteria for being 
allowed to enjoy the benefit of particular “stick” may also change, for instance in the context 
of involvement in cyber interference. Cf. supra text accompanying note 97. It is then the 
general decrease in the number and strength of the “sticks” that, following the decreased 
lack of State discretion to remain fully neutral, especially in view of the role of the U.N. 
Security Council’s competences in this context, gives rise to the increasing debate about 
whether the law of neutrality still exists and/or is relevant, noting, however, that that role 
of the Security Council is still primarily limited to the use of (massive armed) force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of a State. See also supra discussion accom-













be a comprehensive tool, a fallback approach in cases where the U.N. Char-
ter’s superior status, the principles of State party-intent, or the rule of mani-
fest absurdity or unreasonableness are inadequate to prioritize a rule of space 
law over a rule of the law of armed conflict or vice versa. 
 
IV. THE MATRIX ON PRIORITIZATION: AN APPROACH TO SOLVING 
THE CONUNDRUM 
 
The analysis of the six examples above and how to address the prioritization 
issue between space law and the law of armed conflict can now be general-
ized into an overall approach helpfully summarized in—and illustrated by—
a simple four-box Matrix on prioritization. 
In all four boxes, the U.N. Charter, not only qualifying as non-domain-
specific,167 but also as lex superior as confirmed by Article 103,168 overrides 
any potentially contradictory terms both in space law and the law of armed 
conflict. In addition, the Charter is effectively integrated into both, but, of 
course, only within the boundaries of the application of the Charter itself, as 
determined by the structural principles of space law. As a consequence, the 
right to use force in self-defense against an armed attack or if sanctioned or 
mandated by the Security Council applies in outer space. Here, in the absence 
of any space domain-specific law of armed conflict, the Charter takes with it 
those parts of the law of armed conflict of a non-domain-specific character. 
The first box of the Matrix addresses the legal situation between bellig-
erents. There, clearly, any further rules, rights, and obligations of the law of 
armed conflict override any potentially contradictory rules, rights, or obliga-
tions derived from space law. But again, given that there is thus far no law 
of armed conflict truly specifically applicable to the domain of outer space, 
this applies only to the extent those rules, rights, and obligations are either 
formulated in a non-domain-specific manner or, even though framed in a 
domain-specific manner are reflective of underlying principles that are non-
domain-specific. 
However, that does not resolve the two further issues addressed here: 
first, what law applies where the U.N. Charter does not apply, given the lim-
itations of its territorial approach to the use of force; and second, what law 
controls when the use of force does not meet the thresholds of the Charter. 
                                                                                                                      
167. The United Nations is generally purposed to “maintain international peace and 
security,” regardless of where threats to that international peace and security may arise. U.N. 
Charter art. 1, ¶ 1. 












Here, recourse is required to the non-Charter-based law of armed conflict, 
which then, in turn, requires an analysis of the extent to which relevant rules 
are non-domain-specific, either stated explicitly or implicitly in their under-
lying principles. For example, the law of armed conflict’s general principles 
of military necessity, discrimination, and proportionality—especially as ap-
plied through the law of targeting—are likely to control, thus determining 
the legality of any targeting activities. At the same time, unless it can be ar-
gued that an armed attack on a satellite is properly addressed by such non-
domain-specific law of armed conflict, giving rise to an appropriate reinter-
pretation of applicable space law clauses as per State party intent, manifest 
absurdity or unreasonableness, the peacetime rules of space law, such as 
those calling for payment of damage caused by space activities, would apply. 
The last box of the Matrix addresses the legal situation between third 
party (or neutral) States to the armed conflict. In this context, the rules, 
rights, and obligations of space law maintain their full force and applicability, 
subject only to the U.N. Charter to the extent it applies, since the Charter 
contains lex superior also on how States should behave outside of armed con-
flicts. That follows directly from their decision to stay out of the conflict and 
the concomitant legal consequences that brings with it. Thus, neutral States 
should, for instance, continue to treat each other’s astronauts as envoys of 
mankind and be held fully liable for damage caused to each other’s property, 
whether located on Earth or in outer space. The only caveat here concerns 
the applicability of the law of armed conflict’s subset of neutrality-related 
rules, in as far as the relevant “sticks” in the “bundle” are expressly formu-
lated as non-domain-specific or to be interpreted as being implicitly non-
domain-specific. Only to the extent analysis might unearth such rules as re-
quiring neutral States not to treat astronauts of other neutral States under 
some circumstances as envoys of mankind, would those otherwise applicable 
space law rules be overridden. 
The two difficult boxes in the Matrix are, of course, the ones addressing 
the legal rules, rights, and obligations that establish the legal relationship be-
tween belligerents and neutrals.169 Outer space is a single immense domain. 
                                                                                                                      
169. Note that, technically speaking, the boxes should be expected to fundamentally 
mirror each other, the one addressing the rights and obligations of any neutral State vis-à-
vis any belligerent State and the other addressing the rights and obligations of any belligerent 
State vis-à-vis any neutral State. In order not to engage here in highly theoretical and meta-
legal discussions on whether and to what extent every obligation of one State mirrors a right 
of another, the simple solution is to have two boxes, noting the large measure of duplication 












Yet, space activities require a large measure of international cooperation be-
cause of their importance to today’s globalized economy. As a result, the 
neutral-belligerent relationship presents complex issues. For instance, a sin-
gle damaged satellite can mean damage is suffered by a host of different 
States that may rely on it for such services as television, navigation, business 
and finance, and climate and environmental monitoring. Moreover, the de-
struction of a belligerent’s space object may, in turn, cause damage to all 
States with resources in outer space—space debris does not discriminate. 
Here, again, the law of neutrality becomes relevant. To the extent it de-
fines rights and obligations of neutral States during an armed conflict in a 
non-domain-specific manner, whether expressly so formulated or correctly 
interpreted, those would override the otherwise applicable regime of space 
law. The treatment of third State-astronauts by a belligerent and the handling 
of third State-damage caused by a belligerent’s military space operations 
would thus be legitimized within the applicable boundaries of the law of 
armed conflict, read with reference to a neutral State’s “bundle” of relevant 
“sticks.” 
However, this approach can only be applied to the extent relevant rights 
and obligations do not work erga omnes. The absence of territorial sovereignty 
and the resulting free access to all areas of outer space, including celestial 
bodies and the requirement to use them for peaceful purposes, the absten-
tion from stationing or orbiting of weapons of mass destruction, and regis-
tering satellites in an international context do constitute such rules erga omnes; 
whereas the liability regime, given the possibility of cascading harms, also has 
a major erga omnes element to it. 
A belligerent might legitimately cause damage to a satellite of an oppo-
nent without paying for the resulting damage, but what if it also causes dam-
age to satellites of third States? What if the satellite targeted is not only used 
or owned by that State but by third States, as is often the case? A belligerent 
may be entitled to seek military advantages by shrouding military launches in 
mystery or by using celestial bodies for military maneuvers or installations,  
but in so doing it violates the rights of other States to be informed of the 
launching of space objects and to enjoy the benefits of demilitarized celestial 
bodies. While an opposing belligerent might not be entitled to compensa-












damages suffered. Violating obligations to register space objects170 and to 
maintain celestial bodies as demilitarized areas would amount to violations 
of obligations erga omnes. 
Here, the only caveat would be the applicability of the law of armed con-
flict’s subset of neutrality-related rules, and once more only insofar as the 
relevant “sticks” in the “bundle” are formulated or interpreted in a non-do-
main-specific manner. To the extent analysis of the current “bundle of 
rights” of neutrality would discover non-domain-specific rules that, for ex-
ample, prohibit neutral States from allowing belligerents the use of their 
space infrastructure or services, belligerents might lawfully damage such in-
frastructure or prevent the use of those services without paying compensa-
tion. But here again, the belligerent State may still be held liable for damaging 
the relevant sticks of the neutral State. 
Finally, as indicated, the Matrix rules of treaty interpretation would offer 
a tool of last recourse in case the result of the prioritization mechanism 
would cause an undesirable deviation from State party-intent or give rise to 
a manifestly absurd or unreasonable outcome. 
 
  
                                                                                                                      
170. In any event, the Registration Convention requires just a description of the “Gen-
eral function of the space object” without any amplifying details. Moreover, it requires only 
that any information is to be provided “as soon as practicable,” with few clues indications 
as to what that means. Registration Convention, supra note 22, art. IV(1). In other words, 




















Belligerent engaged in the armed 
conflict in outer space 
Neutral (third) State with respect to 
the armed conflict in outer space 
Belligerent en-
gaged in the 
armed conflict 
in outer space 
(1) U.N. Charter rules & law of armed 
conflict rules carried with it (by definition 
non-domain-specific) – to the extent ap-
plicable as per the structural principles of 
space law 
(2) Non-U.N.-Charter-based (other) non-
domain-specific law of armed conflict 
rules 
(3) Substantive space law rules 
(4) Treaty rules whose application would be 
more in line with parties’ intentions or 
less manifestly absurd or unreasonable 
than conflicting treaty rules 
(1) U.N. Charter rules & non-domain-spe-
cific law of armed conflict rules carried 
with it (by definition non-domain-spe-
cific) – to the extent applicable as per the 
structural principles of space law 
(2) Erga omnes provisions & effects sub-
stantive space law rules 
(3) Other non-domain-specific law of armed 
conflict rules – as applicable per non-do-
main-specific law of neutrality 
(4) Non-erga-omnes substantive space law 
rules 
(5) Treaty rules whose application would be 
more in line with parties’ intentions or 
less manifestly absurd or unreasonable 
than conflicting treaty rules 
Neutral (third) 
State with re-
spect to the 
armed conflict 
in outer space 
(1) U.N. Charter rules & non-domain-spe-
cific law of armed conflict rules carried 
with it (by definition non-domain-spe-
cific) – to the extent applicable as per the 
structural principles of space law 
(2) Erga omnes provisions & effects sub-
stantive space law rules 
(3) Other non-domain-specific law of armed 
conflict rules – as applicable per non-do-
main-specific law of neutrality 
(4) Non-erga-omnes substantive space law 
rules 
(5) Treaty rules whose application would be 
more in line with parties’ intentions or 
less manifestly absurd or unreasonable 
than conflicting treaty rules 
(1) U.N. Charter rules – to the extent ap-
plicable as per the structural principles of 
space law 
(2) Substantive space law rules (except where 
non-domain-specific neutrality law ap-
plies & dictates differently) 
(3) Law of armed conflict rules generally 
(4) Treaty rules whose application would be 
more in line with parties’ intentions or 
less manifestly absurd or unreasonable 
than conflicting treaty rules 
 
















Of course, the Matrix should be seen as an instrument of initial guidance 
rather than an instrument providing an unsalable and final solution. Its key 
strength is approaching the prioritization conundrum in a transparent, fair, 
and legally sound manner. I do not claim completeness for it, certainly not 
in terms of its substance, but it does provide a structured approach that in-
vites further corrections and refinements necessary for it to develop into a 
fuller or even authoritative model to address the prioritization of space law 
vis-à-vis the law of armed conflict or vice versa. 
At this stage, already two fundamental shortcomings can be discerned. 
First, using the Matrix to determine prioritization will often require further 
analysis of the immense but rather incoherent and incomplete set of rules 
under the law of armed conflict, in particular, the law of neutrality, to deter-
mine whether those rules—or at least their underlying principles—are non-
domain-specific. Second, the novel prospect of armed conflict in outer space 
and the almost complete absence of State practice and opinio juris make it 
difficult to go beyond the relevant treaties. Here, the absence of any law to 
be interpreted means there is no prioritization issue for the Matrix to resolve. 
Similarly, what the Matrix currently may point to as the proper interpretation 
and application of a particular rule of law, that interpretation and application 
exists in the absence of significant State practice and opinio juris, and may 
rapidly change as State practice develops. For example, to the extent that 
future State practice and opinio juris would condone violations of erga omnes 
space law obligations, and to the extent the U.N. Security Council takes no 
action against belligerents overstepping these general boundaries, the legal 
relationship between belligerent and neutral States in terms of rights and ob-
ligations might well change. 
Similarly, State practice, opinio juris, or Security Council action may deter-
mine whether the U.N. Charter’s prohibition of the use of force against an-
other State’s sovereign territory equates with a prohibition of the use of force 
against another State’s satellite, ignoring the fundamental differentiation that 
space law makes between “territory” and “quasi-territory” or whether such 
satellites are the equivalent of ships or aircraft under the law of armed con-
flict. State practice, opinio juris, or Security Council action may also determine 
the question of whether a right of self-defense outside of the Charter or 
other legal justification for the use of force under the law of armed conflict 
would prevail over rules, rights, and obligations under space law designed to 












Hopefully, the Outer Space Treaty’s many references to peace and peace-
ful will continue to characterize space activities, so that Star Wars will remain 
a work of fiction. However, it would certainly be best for the precise legal 
contours of military space activities to be clear before “Space Wars” are upon 
us. The Matrix of Prioritization, as outlined here, presents a valuable contri-
bution to achieving exactly that end. 
 
